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Protection of Labor Rights and Interests of Workers in New Forms of Employment

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Abstract: The rise of the platform economy has reshaped the organization of work and confronted the protection of workers' rights with new challenges. Traditional labor law takes the existence of an "employment relationship" as its central criterion; where flexibility is introduced through dispatch, piece-rate pay and platform algorithms, the nature of platform-based work becomes difficult to identify accurately, leaving some workers inadequately protected. Drawing on five years of institutional experimentation and judicial cases as its analytical material, this paper identifies the principal difficulties: failure to satisfy the criteria of subordination, insufficient portability of social insurance accounts, absence of algorithmic transparency and consultation procedures, and inadequate channels for dispute resolution. It therefore argues that a "tiered and classified protection" mechanism should be established: the criteria for determining subordination should be refined, social insurance accounts made portable, algorithmic transparency enhanced, dispute-resolution mechanisms improved, and differentiated protection provided according to the specific form of employment. The platform economy has generated a large number of new forms of employment. The working patterns of food-delivery riders, ride-hailing drivers and comparable groups differ markedly from traditional employment: formal labor contracts are often not signed and working hours and locations are flexible, which increases the difficulty of identifying an employment relationship and places some workers at a disadvantage in asserting their rights. Workers in these new forms of employment face higher risks, greater work intensity and weaker occupational stability, yet their labor rights are relatively poorly protected. It is therefore necessary to strengthen, at the institutional level, review and disclosure mechanisms so that the application of technology does not infringe workers' basic rights. As to the protective path, the single uniform institutional arrangement should be replaced by rights floors and protection standards set according to the degree of income dependence, work intensity and protection needs of each form of employment.

Keywords: Platform economy; new forms of employment; labor rights protection; identification of employment relationship; tiered protection; algorithmic governance.

1. Statement of the Problem

In recent years, the protection of the rights and interests of workers in new forms of employment, such as online streamers and food-delivery riders, has become an increasingly prominent issue. The number of such workers in China has reached 84 million, and the flexible-employment group is larger still. The problem, however, is not a lack of employment opportunities: it lies in the fact that existing institutions and protection systems have yet to connect effectively with this group.

Traditional labor law takes the "employment relationship" as its core and protects workers through limits on working hours, minimum wages, social insurance contributions and similar institutions; those who fall outside the scope of an employment relationship, however, cannot obtain full protection. Platform-based employment is characterized by flexible working time, place and management style, which makes the identification of an employment relationship difficult and renders a management model built around the individual enterprise inapplicable. At the same time, the spread of algorithmic management subjects workers to stronger constraints, while dispersed workplaces and flexible hours further complicate the protection of their rights.

The state has accordingly pushed for institutional adjustment. In 2021, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and six other departments explicitly proposed establishing a transitional path between the traditional employment relationship and fully independent operation, introducing the concept of "circumstances that do not fully meet the conditions for establishing an employment relationship." In 2022, the relevant departments further stressed that "basic labor standards" should fully cover workers in new forms of employment and that platform enterprises should be required to regularize their employment practices. In 2024, the Supreme People's Court issued guiding cases that expressly treat "being subject to platform algorithmic management" as an important basis for determining an employment relationship. In April 2025, nine departments jointly launched a special campaign aimed at achieving, within three years, full coverage of rights protection for workers in new forms of employment.

2. The Legal Profile of Workers in New Forms of Employment

2.1. Three Characteristics of the Working Form

The "newness" of new forms of employment lies mainly in the technological transformation of the way work is organized rather than in the content of the work itself. First, the entry threshold is low: a worker need only complete platform registration in order to receive orders, and the traditional stages of recruitment, interview and contract signing are omitted. Second, the platform's management of workers is not direct and directive but indirect, exercised through the order-dispatch sequence, service ratings, overtime penalties and user reviews. Third, remuneration is generally paid per order, income fluctuates with order volume, and relatively fixed wage standards are absent, which also makes overtime pay

and economic compensation difficult to calculate.

These three features interlock: workers appear to enjoy considerable autonomy while in fact occupying a strongly subordinate position. A rider, for example, may decide for himself whether to go online and accept orders, but has almost no room for negotiation over which orders to take, how to plan delivery routes or the time limit for delivery; an online streamer may likewise set broadcasting hours flexibly, yet must still comply with the platform's established rules on revenue sharing and traffic recommendation. This tension between external freedom and internal constraint is an important reason why the protection of workers' rights currently faces difficulties.

The arrangement has a triangular structure that deserves separate attention. The platform concludes service agreements with consumers, sets the terms on which orders are distributed, and simultaneously determines the price, the time limit and the sanction for breach, while the worker performs the service in person and bears the physical risk. The consumer, who pays the platform rather than the worker, has no contractual relationship with the person who actually performs the work. In such a structure the power to set rules and the duty to bear risk are separated: the platform exercises managerial prerogative without assuming the corresponding obligations, whereas the worker assumes the obligations without holding the corresponding rights. This separation, rather than the flexibility of working hours as such, is what makes the traditional categories inadequate.

2.2. The "Third Status" of Identity

The guiding opinions issued in 2021 introduced a "trichotomy", confirming at the institutional level a group situated between traditional workers and independent operators. This classification is reasonable in practice, but it has produced a new institutional predicament: workers of the intermediate type lack rights-and-obligations rules that match their status. Such persons can neither fully enjoy the mandatory protection provided by labor law nor possess the bargaining power of independent market participants to spread business risk. Scholars summarize this situation as "labor without a relationship, a relationship without protection", a description that aptly captures the real contradiction facing this group.

The ambiguity in defining worker status directly affects the implementation of specific rights. Take occupational injury: once an employment relationship is found to exist, compensation may be claimed under the regulations on work-related injury insurance; if not, the worker can only resort to commercial accident insurance or civil tort claims. In practice, a large number of situations neither fully meet the criteria for an employment relationship nor fall into another category, and for a long time lacked an effective protection channel until the establishment of a dedicated occupational injury protection system partly closed this gap.

2.3. The Distinctive Nature of Rights Demands

Compared with employees in a standard employment relationship, platform delivery workers display three distinctive features in their rights demands. First, occupational injuries are highly immediate—traffic accidents, falls from height and violent incidents may occur at any time—so ex ante protection is often more valuable than ex post compensation. Second, individual demands are scattered: workers are distributed across delivery stations and work in different time slots, which makes it difficult to form unified bargaining agendas or to secure effective organizational support. Third, risks have pronounced spillover effects: the rigid speed requirements imposed by platforms affect not only riders themselves but also public road safety and the legitimate rights and interests of end consumers. These features indicate that directly applying the traditional framework of labor law cannot effectively meet the practical needs of this group, and that the relevant institutional arrangements must be adjusted in both the protective path and the mode of operation.

The comparison with standard employment also reveals a difference in the object of protection. For standard employees, the law mainly protects income continuity and the reproduction of labor power, and the risks addressed are those of unemployment, illness and old age, which materialize over a longer horizon. For platform workers, the most pressing risks materialize within a single working day: a fall, a collision or a sudden account suspension may terminate income immediately. Protection designed around long-term contingencies thus addresses the wrong time horizon, which explains why even workers who are formally covered may remain exposed in practice.

3. Practical Difficulties in Rights Protection

3.1. Tension Between the Identification Standard and the Facts of Employment

In adjudication, courts have gradually ceased to characterize cases solely by the title of the contract. The first batch of thematic guiding cases published by the Supreme People's Court in late 2024 put forward the criterion of "dominant labor management"; typical cases released in April of the following year further held that although the platform economy and technological means have changed the form of management, the essence of labor management has not changed as a result. In determining specific cases, courts focus mainly on whether actual employment facts exist and whether a relationship of dominant management has been formed. The factors comprehensively assessed usually include the platform's reward and penalty mechanisms, the worker's autonomy in task allocation and pricing, whether the worker's income depends mainly on that platform, and whether the work undertaken forms part of the platform's core business.

Substantive review may work in an individual case, but it can hardly yield stable judgments across similar cases. Even within the same platform, the same station and the same type of work, differences in the layers of subcontracting and in the wording of contract clauses may lead to diametrically opposite outcomes. An even more prominent difficulty is concealed employment: the platform delegates business to franchisees or labor-service companies, yet the worker's order-taking account, performance assessment and wage payment remain in the hands of the platform. Once a dispute arises, the various entities pass liability among themselves and the worker can hardly identify the party truly bound. It may be said that the substantive turn in identification standards has answered the question of "what to review", but the question of "to whom the claim should be addressed" remains unresolved.

3.2. Gaps in Social Insurance Coverage

Within the rights-protection system, social insurance is the most rigid element and also the most difficult to adapt institutionally. The current employee social insurance system uses the employment relationship and the total wage bill as the basis for contributions, whereas workers in new forms of employment often lack a stable employment relationship and have unstable incomes, which makes their direct inclusion in the traditional framework difficult. In response to this difficulty, the occupational injury protection pilot introduced a contribution mechanism of "charging per order and declaring monthly", which no longer treats an employment relationship as a precondition for participation and does not use the total wage bill as the calculation base, with platform enterprises bearing the contribution liability in a unified manner. According to public data, by the end of October 2025 the pilot had enrolled 23.25 million participants cumulatively, indicating that the system has been preliminarily validated in terms of both coverage and practical protective effect.

Two structural reasons account for the difficulty. First, the contributory logic of social insurance presupposes a determinate contribution base and a determinate contribution payer, whereas platform income is scattered across orders, seasons and accounts, so that neither the base nor the payer is self-evident. Second, the pooling principle presupposes a definable group of insured persons, whereas the boundary of the group concerned shifts with the way contracts are drafted. Where a scheme is built on the premise that participation follows from an employment relationship, any expansion of coverage requires either redefining the relationship or creating a parallel scheme, and both routes impose administrative and fiscal costs that pilots alone cannot resolve.

The current occupational injury protection system, however, covers only work-related injury risks; old-age, medical and unemployment protection still require workers to participate voluntarily in the capacity of flexible-employment persons. This voluntary model encounters two difficulties in practice: on the one hand, premiums are borne entirely by individuals, which conflicts with the reality of fluctuating incomes; on the other hand, benefits are realized over a long cycle, whereas workers tend to spend limited funds on current living expenses. Since 2025, some platforms have begun to trial old-age insurance subsidy schemes under which the platform and the individual each bear half of the cost, and JD.com has directly paid the "five insurances and one housing fund" for its full-time riders, covering about 150,000 persons. Such practices have a certain reference value for piloting, but their continuity depends largely on the willingness of the enterprises concerned and has not yet been elevated to binding institutional norms.

3.3. Disorder in the Labor Process Under the Absence of Algorithmic Regulation

Algorithms constitute a key instrument of day-to-day platform governance and are also the area in which workers' rights are most easily overlooked. Specifically, order-dispatch logic directly determines workers' sources of income, delivery time limits bear on the bottom line of riding safety, and rating mechanisms determine whether workers can continue to obtain orders. Platforms, however, often refuse to disclose these rules on the ground of protecting trade secrets. As a result, workers lack knowledge of the current terms, cannot learn of rule adjustments and have no effective way to question their reasonableness. In actual operation, once the delivery time set by the system approaches or even exceeds the physical safety limits of road traffic, the economic pressure generated by overtime penalties is transformed into high-risk behavior such as speeding and disregarding traffic signals.

The nature of this power should be stated precisely. Algorithmic management is not merely a technical means of improving efficiency; it performs the functions that collective agreements and workplace rules once performed, namely allocating tasks, fixing effort levels, setting sanctions and resolving disputes. Because these functions are exercised through code rather than through instructions issued by a person, the exercise of power becomes difficult to observe, to document and to contest. A worker who is penalized by a rating adjustment cannot point to a decision-maker, and a regulator who wishes to examine the rule cannot inspect a document that does not exist in written form. The opacity is therefore not incidental to the technology but a structural feature of algorithmic governance.

In recent years, judicial organs and policy documents have gradually signaled a shift toward guiding the standardized application of algorithms. The Supreme People's Court has made clear that the use of algorithms in the field of labor management must be constrained by law, that the design of algorithms should incorporate the views of employee representatives, and that the competent authorities should strengthen supervision over the process of algorithm formulation. A clear gap nonetheless remains between macro principles and operative rules: the specific boundaries of the duty to explain algorithms have not been clarified, the path for trade unions or employee representatives to participate in algorithmic decision-making is not expressly provided, and the remedies available to workers when algorithmic rules are improper have not been systematically arranged. These issues currently lack an operational institutional foundation.

3.4. Weak Collective Bargaining and Organized Capacity for Rights Protection

Platform workers who assert their rights as individuals often face a serious imbalance between input and return. A lawsuit to confirm an employment relationship frequently takes more than a year, while the amount at stake is often a few thousand yuan in deducted fines or economic compensation. In such circumstances most workers choose, on cost-benefit grounds, not to pursue the matter. Collective bargaining could in theory spread the burden of individual rights protection, but in practice union coverage among this group of workers is markedly insufficient, and workers are dispersed across different franchisees and delivery stations, so that it is difficult either to identify a clear counterpart for bargaining or to consolidate common demands. Occasional spontaneous protests such as a "collective log-off" cannot, for want of a formal organizational transmission path, be elevated into binding institutional arrangements, and participants may face corresponding legal liability.

3.5. Cost and Efficiency Dilemmas of Remedial Channels

The current remedial system faces a triple predicament. First, jurisdiction is unclear: workers in new forms of employment typically register in one place, undertake business across regions and are settled by an enterprise in a third place, which makes the jurisdictional link in arbitration

or litigation hard to determine. Second, evidence is difficult to obtain: order-dispatch information, route traces and deduction details are all held in platform back offices, individual workers can hardly retrieve them, and evidentiary rules favorable to workers have not yet been widely applied in practice. Third, institutional linkages are poor: occupational injury protection, commercial accident insurance, civil tort remedies and work-related injury insurance coexist, and there is no unified operational standard as to whether and how benefits may be accumulated or offset. In a case heard by the Beijing Financial Court in 2025, the court held that "new occupational injury" protection and commercial accident insurance are neither substitutive nor offsetting and that the parties are entitled to claim both in parallel. This judicial position is of reference value, but a systematic arrangement of comparable rules remains a long way off.

4. Deeper Causes of the Predicament

4.1. Declining Explanatory Power of the Subordination Theory

The identification of a traditional employment relationship relies on three dimensions—personal subordination, economic subordination and organizational subordination—standards originally derived from the continuous control exercised by managers over workers in factory settings. The emergence of the platform economy has transformed the form of these subordinate features: dispatch algorithms replace direct instructions, rating mechanisms replace on-site supervision, and account permissions constitute a new organizational hierarchy. Subordination itself has not disappeared; it is reproduced in a datafied form. The existing theoretical framework, however, lacks an effective description of such "datafied subordination", with the result that courts often resort to individual judgment and practical experience in dealing with specific cases, which weakens the stability and predictability of judicial outcomes.

Three alternatives to the classical test have been proposed, each with a distinct weakness. The economic-dependence approach asks whether the worker depends on a single counterparty for income, and captures the situation of full-time riders reasonably well, but leaves part-time and multi-platform workers outside its scope. The organizational-embedment approach asks whether the worker is integrated into the business organization, and is suited to platform work, yet it tends to sweep in genuinely independent contractors who also rely on platform infrastructure. The risk-allocation approach asks who bears the commercial risk of the engagement, and is analytically elegant, but requires information about pricing and cost structures that courts rarely obtain. No single substitute fully replaces the subordination test, which is why current practice combines several indicators and weighs them case by case.

4.2. Fragmentation of Institutional Supply and Reliance on Pilots

Current responses mainly take the form of special policies, pilot schemes or guiding opinions. These documents have relatively limited legal force and are worded largely in terms of "encouragement", "guidance" and "exploration", with few mandatory provisions. Piloting helps reduce risk, but if it remains the principal path over the long term it may produce institutional disparities across regions: workers within pilot areas enjoy corresponding protection, whereas comparable workers in other areas lack institutional coverage. At the same time, enterprises that participate early often bear higher compliance costs, while enterprises that adopt a wait-and-see attitude gain a favorable position in market competition, which to a certain extent dampens the internal impetus for the diffusion of the new system.

4.3. Cost Shifting and Externalization of Liability by Platforms

The platform economy relies on asset-light operation and flexible employment to sustain efficiency, and one of its core logics is to shift labor costs outward. Once policy obliges platforms to pay social insurance contributions or to assume occupational injury protection obligations, platforms tend to lower per-order remuneration, tighten task assessments and reduce the number of formal positions, thereby redistributing the added expenditure onto workers. This partly explains an apparently counterintuitive situation: after the protection system is implemented, some workers actually take home less. If institutional design stops at identifying the contribution payer without tracking where the cost ultimately flows, the protective intent of the policy may be weakened in actual effect.

The mechanism of cost shifting can be stated in economic terms. Where the supply of labor to the platform is elastic and the demand for the service is price-sensitive, an increase in the platform's unit labor cost is passed on through a reduction in the per-unit price paid to workers rather than absorbed by the platform or transferred to consumers. The nominal incidence of the contribution therefore falls on the platform, while the effective incidence falls on the worker. This does not imply that the policy is misconceived, but it does imply that the policy objective cannot be achieved by designating a contributor alone: unless the level of remuneration per order is monitored, or a floor is imposed, the protective intent is neutralized by adjustment of the wage.

4.4. Dual Deficiency in Workers' Willingness and Capacity to Assert Rights

Within the workforce itself, differences are pronounced. Some workers treat platform work merely as a temporary source of income and prefer to retain immediate cash earnings rather than make current sacrifices for long-term protection such as social insurance. Others acknowledge the necessity of participation but, constrained by limited legal knowledge and limited daily time and energy, find it hard to take the initiative. This internal differentiation means that institutional arrangements such as "voluntary participation" and "voluntary bargaining", which appear to respect individual choice, often translate in practice into workers absorbing risks themselves. If the protection system rests entirely on the voluntary principle, the cost of decision-making is effectively shifted onto the party that possesses the least information and the weakest bargaining power.

5. Pathways for Improving Rights Protection

5.1. Replacing "Binary Identity Classification" with "Tiered Protection of Rights"

Rather than repeatedly contesting the binary question of "whether an employment relationship exists", it is preferable

to shift toward tiered protection based on the nature of the rights concerned. Specifically, rights related to life safety and physical health—including occupational injury insurance, maximum working hours, rest arrangements and safety education—should serve as a basic floor, mandatorily applicable regardless of whether an employment relationship exists, and should be comprehensively covered. Rights concerning income distribution and career development—such as minimum wages, pay cycles and vocational skills training—may be subject to varying degrees of application according to work intensity and the closeness of management. Rights concerning association and social dialogue—such as joining a trade union and participating in collective bargaining—may be progressively opened to this group as conditions mature. The significance of this tiered approach lies in avoiding the difficulty of status classification, shifting the focus of discussion from "how to classify" to "how to confer rights", while leaving room for the differentiated governance of various new business forms.

The tiered approach has limits that should be acknowledged. It presupposes that the content of each tier can be agreed upon, yet the boundary between the basic floor and the graded tier is itself contested: whether a maximum working time belongs to safety or to income is not a technical question but a policy choice, and the answer determines whether the protection is mandatory or conditional. The approach also risks institutionalizing a lower tier of protection, if the graded rights are set at levels so modest that the intermediate category becomes a permanent status rather than a transitional one. Its value therefore depends on the floor being set at a level that is genuinely protective, and on periodic review of whether the graded tier is converging upward.

5.2. Refining Substantive Review Rules and Identifying the Real Employing Entity

In judicial adjudication and arbitration, it is necessary to construct a set of review standards centered on key factors. Account management rights, task allocation authority, pricing capacity, performance assessment and reward-penalty mechanisms, uniform and equipment requirements, wage payment patterns and business affiliation should be enumerated one by one, with the weight of each factor and the legal presumption effect it produces expressly provided. On this basis, a rule presuming the employing entity should be established: where a platform exercises substantive control over workers through algorithms while the party nominally contracting with the worker performs only auxiliary functions such as registration or settlement of fees, the platform should be presumed to be the actual employing entity and should bear the burden of proving that it "did not participate in management". This rule helps curb the practice of transferring or fragmenting employment liability through multi-layered outsourcing structures.

5.3. Building a Social Insurance Mechanism in Which "Rights Follow the Person"

At the level of occupational injury protection, once the national coverage target for 2026 is achieved, the focus of the system should shift to a moderate raising of benefit standards and a simplification of claim procedures. At the same time, the boundaries and linkages between this system and commercial insurance and civil compensation should be clarified so as to prevent duplicate payment or gaps in liability. For old-age and medical insurance, participation mechanisms detached from the employment relationship should be accelerated: payment channels not tied to an employment relationship should be opened, flexible contributions per order, per month or per quarter should be supported, and the contribution base may be determined by the individual within a prescribed range; transfer and continuity arrangements between regions should be further connected in order to address the ruptures in rights caused by the frequent mobility of these workers. Subsidies offered by platform enterprises may play a guiding role during the transition but are not suitable as a long-term reliance. From the standpoint of institutional sustainability, a tripartite contribution structure shared by individuals, platforms and public finance should ultimately take shape, gradually replacing the current loosely organized voluntary model.

5.4. Advancing the Rule-of-Law and Democratic Governance of Algorithms

Algorithmic governance can be constructed along three dimensions: information transparency, consultative participation and rights remedies. On information transparency, platforms should be obliged to explain, in language readily intelligible to workers, core rules such as order dispatch, delivery time limits, penalty provisions and rating standards, and any adjustment to terms affecting major interests should be published in advance and subjected to filing procedures. On consultative participation, algorithm-related rules should be brought within the scope of collective bargaining, with trade unions or representatives elected by workers substantively participating in the rule-making process, and the competent departments may require platforms to submit special assessment materials on the effects of algorithmic operation. On rights remedies, workers should be guaranteed channels through which to challenge improper rules and erroneous determinations, and a fast-track mechanism linking internal platform appeals with external arbitration should be established; in addition, in cases of personal injury such as traffic accidents caused by improperly set delivery time limits, a presumption of platform fault may be considered in determining liability.

Transparency alone, however, is an incomplete remedy. Disclosure of rules informs workers of the constraints under which they act, but does not change those constraints; consultation gives workers a voice, but not necessarily an effective one where the agenda and the data remain in the hands of the platform. A further element is therefore needed: independent evaluation of algorithmic systems before deployment and at intervals thereafter, conducted by a body with access to the relevant parameters and empowered to require modification. Such evaluation converts the abstract duty of care into an observable procedure, and provides courts and regulators with a factual record on which findings of fault can be based.

5.5. Improving Diversified Dispute Resolution and Organized Rights Protection

At the level of dispute resolution, specialized adjudication teams or fast-track panels may be established in areas where disputes over new forms of employment are frequent, so that cases can be accepted on a centralized basis. The allocation of the burden of proof should also be adjusted: platforms should be required to submit the order, dispatch and settlement records in their possession, and should bear the corresponding

adverse consequences if they refuse to do so. Online mediation and online arbitration should be promoted in order to reduce the time and effort that workers operating across regions must expend in protecting their rights. At the level of organization, the conditions for union membership should be appropriately relaxed so that workers can join unions flexibly by industry, locality or platform, gradually forming a complementary structure of "industrial unions and platform unions". Industry-level collective bargaining should also be advanced, bringing remuneration methods, working time limits, occupational safety and dispute handling within its scope. Reducing the cost of individual rights protection through organization is the most effective institutional arrangement, and it also helps channel scattered group demands into standardized institutional processes.

6. Conclusion

The new forms of employment are essentially a natural change in the mode of work accompanying social development, not a special exception within labor relations. If the institutional standards of the traditional industrial era continue to be applied to such employment patterns, a finding of "difficulty in characterization" is hardly surprising. Approached from a different direction—no longer insisting on status determination and relationship classification, but focusing instead on the rights and resource allocation that workers actually enjoy—many long-unresolved problems become tractable. Institutional experimentation over the past five years offers strong evidence: an occupational injury protection pilot that does not presuppose an employment relationship can operate normally, arrangements under which platforms and workers share the cost of participation are workable, and courts have gradually formed relatively consistent substantive standards in adjudication. The pressing task at present is to integrate these scattered pilot experiences into an institutional framework that is clearly tiered, imposes reasonable burdens on all parties and provides accessible remedial channels for workers. The intensity of protection certainly merits attention, but the predictability of protection outcomes matters no less. For a food-delivery rider, knowing with certainty that compensation will be reliably obtained after a work-related injury is of far greater practical value than the signal sent by winning a single case in one particular locality.

This study has evident limitations. It relies on documentary and judicial materials rather than on systematic field data, and therefore cannot quantify the effect of specific institutional arrangements on the level of protection actually obtained by workers in different regions and different segments of the platform economy. Nor does it examine in detail the fiscal cost of the proposed tripartite contribution structure, which depends on local fiscal capacity and on the number of participants. Subsequent research might compare the outcomes of the occupational injury pilot across provinces, examine how the level of per-order remuneration responds to the imposition of contribution obligations, and evaluate whether tiered protection in practice converges upward or stabilizes at a reduced level. These questions require data that are only now becoming available.

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