Collusion and Competition: The Generation Mechanism of Chinese State-owned Enterprises’ Image Projects--A Case Study Based on the Construction of Cultural Landmarks in China

Authors

  • Jiechan Song

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/rntt7749

Keywords:

Chinese image project, government competition, collusion among higher-level and lower-level government, isomorphic responsibility.

Abstract

The implementation of image projects is likely to result in the inefficient utilisation of resources, an increase in local government debt and a range of other adverse consequences. Conversely, studies focusing on state-owned enterprises may still offer scope for further investigation. This study employs the construction of the "G Garden Project" cultural landmark as a case study. The findings of this analysis are as follows: (1) The collusion of image projects in China is not limited to the upper and lower levels of SOEs, but also between SOEs and governments; (2) The interests of the provincial government and municipal government overlap under the system of isomorphic responsibility; (3) The central government establishes benchmarks to assess provincial and municipal governments, where goal replacement occurs at lower levels of government, ultimately leading to the generation of image projects.

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Published

21-07-2025

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Section

Articles

How to Cite

Song, J. (2025). Collusion and Competition: The Generation Mechanism of Chinese State-owned Enterprises’ Image Projects--A Case Study Based on the Construction of Cultural Landmarks in China. International Journal of Education and Social Development, 3(3), 79-86. https://doi.org/10.54097/rntt7749